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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KATHRYN COLLARD, TRUSTEE
of the LeRoy Collard Trust,
Plaintiff & Appellee,
v.
NAGLE CONSTRUCTION, INC., A
Utah corporation, GARY M. NAGLE,
an individual, MARILYN F. NAGLE,
an individual,
Defendants & Appellants.
GARY M. NAGLE,

Case No. 20000976-CA

Counterclaim Plaintiff & Appellant,
v.
KATHRYN COLLARD, TRUSTEE of the
LeRoy Collard Trust,
Counterclaim Defendant & Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action by Plaintiff Kathryn Collard, as Trustee of the LeRoy Collard
Trust, to quiet title in the Plaintiff Trust to a condominium ("the Property") originally
purchased by Plaintiffs decedent, LeRoy Collard, from the Nagle Construction
Company, in March, 1978, pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Under the terms of the Contract, Mr. Collard agreed to purchase the Property for
$100,500.00 by: (1) making a $10,000.00 down payment; (2) assuming an existing
$60,000.00 mortgage loan owed to First Security Bank ("FSB") by the Nagle
Construction Company, and (3) tendering 55,000 shares of stock in Utah Coal &
Chemical Corporation to Nagle Construction Company.
At the time of closing, Mr. Collard delivered the $10,000 dollar down payment,
assumed and began making the payments on the Nagles1 mortgage loan from FSB and
delivered the 55,000 shares of stock. Mr. Collard moved into the Property and recorded a
Notice of Contract on May 18, 1979. From 1991 until his death in February, 1997, Mr.
Collard's daughter, Kelly James Kirch, resided with him at the Property. During the more
than twenty years that Mr. Collard and his daughter possessed the Property, they have
paid all of the Nagles1 mortgage payments to FSB (although Nagles were never formally
taken off the FEB obligation) and paid all of the property taxes and improvements on the
Property. Mr. Collard conveyed his interest in the Property to the Plaintiff Trust prior to
his death.
On January 13, 1981, an attorney for the Nagles sent Mr. Collard a letter alleging
a breach of contract, default and intent to foreclose on the property on January 13, 1981,
based on an allegation that the 55,000 shares of stock previously conveyed by Mr.
Collard did not have the value represented in the parties' Contract. Mr. Collard's
daughter, attorney Kathryn Collard, sent the Nagles' attorney a letter with documentation
from local stock brokers demonstrating that the stock could have been sold for $85,000
on any number of occasions prior to the Nagles1 letter. Subsequently, the Nagles took no
affirmative legal action to forfeit or foreclose on the Property. The Nagles also never
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returned the cash down payment or the stock to Mr. Collard, and continued to accept
direct payments on the mortgage to FSB by Mr. Collard and/or his daughter, Kelly Kirch,
for more than twenty years and continuing after the filing of this action.
In the Spring of 1999, Plaintiff Collard sought to pay off the outstanding amount
on the FSB Obligation and sell the Property. However, the Nagles refused to convey title
to the Trust, thereby precipitating the filing of this action to quiet title to the Property in
the Plaintiff Trust.
Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff Collard filed the Complaint herein on July 28, 1999, seeking to quiet title
to the Property in the Plaintiff Trust, and alleging breach of contract and failure to convey
title to the property after full performance by Plaintiffs decedent. The Nagles filed an
Answer and Counterclaim, denying Plaintiffs claims and asserting the affirmative
defenses of failure to state a claim, waiver, estoppel and the six year statute of limitations
for an action founded on a written contract contained in §§78-12-1 and 23, U.C.A.
(1953), as amended, and asserting counterclaims seeking forfeiture, foreclosure and quiet
title. In its Reply To Counterclaim, Plaintiff Collard asserted that the Nagles1
counterclaims failed to state a claim, and alternatively, were barred by affirmative
defenses, including the applicable statute of limitations, laches, waiver, and estoppel. The
Nagles filed a Motion For Summary Judgment on February 24, 2000, and Collard filed a
Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment on March 29, 2000.
Disposition In The Lower Court
Following the first oral argument on the parties' cross motions for summary
judgment on July 17, 2000, the lower court initially held that the statute of limitations
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contained in §78-12-23, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, barred both parties' legal claims and
ordered briefing on the issue of whether the court could grant Plaintiff Collard equitable
relief. After additional briefing and a second oral argument on August 30, 2000, further
clarifying the claims of the parties and the evidence regarding their claims, the lower
court modified its previous ruling and held that Plaintiff Collard's legal right to quiet title
had not yet accrued and would accrue when Plaintiff Collard tendered the balance on the
FSB Obligation and that the Nagles should be ordered to deliver title to the Property to
Collard at that time.
The lower court also found and held that the Nagles' counterclaims for forfeiture,
foreclosure and quiet title, all failed on the merits, or were waived and/or barred the six
statute of limitations contained in Section 78-12-23, U.C.A. (1953), based upon Nagles'
admissions that such claims accrued not later than January 25, 1981, and that the Nagles
had taken no affirmative legal action to forfeit or foreclose on the Property for over
twenty years until asserting these causes of action in their Answer and Counterclaim in
this case in September, 1999. Plaintiff Collard filed a motion seeking an award of
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the provisions of the parties' Contract.
On November 6, 2000, the lower court entered its final Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order (Final Judgment) and an Order Denying Motion For
Award of Attorney's Fees And Costs. The Nagles moved for a stay of judgment in the
lower court, which was granted conditioned upon their payment of a supersedeas bond.
When Nagles did not post the bond, the lower court vacated the stay of the judgment and
ordered the escrow agent to deliver title to the Property to Collard as Trustee for the
Plaintiff Trust upon payment of the outstanding FSB Obligation. The Plaintiff Trust paid
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off Nagles' obligation to First Security Bank and received title to the Property which it
later conveyed to a third party for value. The Nagles appealed and the Plaintiff Trust
cross-appealed on the lower court's decision denying Plaintiffs motion for attorney's fees
and costs under the provisions of the parties' Contract.
Statement of Facts
In the lower court, Plaintiff Collard disputed the factual allegations contained in
paragraphs 7,8, 9-11 of the Nagles' "Statement Of Facts", Aplt. Br. 4-5, regarding the
value of the 55,000 shares of stock conveyed by Mr. Collard under the parties' Contract.
Plaintiff Collard also produced independent evidence verifying that the stock could have
been sold for $85,000 on numerous days between the time it was conveyed and January
13,1981, when the Nagles notified Mr. Collard by letter than he was in alleged breach
and default of this part of the Contract. See, "Statement of Facts", ff 19-21, infra, 9-10.
Because the lower court held that the Nagles' counterclaims failed as a matter of law
and/or were waived and/or barred by the statute of limitations, the lower court expressly
declined to decide this issue. See, Findings ofFact And Conclusions ofLaw, dated
November 6, 2000,"FFCZ", f 15, R.525.
The following facts set forth the lower court's factual findings and the additional
undisputed facts and evidence supporting the lower court's findings:
1.

The Property subject of this action is a condominium unit located at 3842

South Quail Hollow Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, in the Cove Point condominiums,
described as Lot B-24, Cove Point, Phase 1, a Planned Unit Development. See,
Complaint, ^5 and attached Uniform Real Estate Contract, R. 2, 7; Plaintiffs
Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment And

Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs Cross Motion For Summary Judgment, hereinafter
"Plaintiffs Memorandum", \\, R.128, 144-147; FFCL, dated November 6, 2000,
"FFCL", Ifl at 2, R.522.
2.

On March 30,1978, LeRoy Collard, as Buyer, and Nagle Construction

Company, as Seller, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract ("Contract"). The stated
purchase price for the Property was $100,500.00. Complaint, \6, R.2, 7; Plaintiffs
Memorandum, f2 and Uniform Real Estate Contract attached as Exhibit A thereto,
R.128, 144-147.
3.

On January 3, 1997, Mr. Collard transferred his interest in the Property by

Warranty Deed to Plaintiff, Kathryn Collard, as Trustee for the LeRoy Collard Trust, and
died on February 8, 1997. Plaintiffs Memorandum, f28 and "Warranty Deed', Exhibit G
thereto, R.132, 180; Complaint, 1J15, 19, R.3. On April 12, 1978, the Nagle Construction
Company conveyed its interest in the property to Gary M. Nagle. See, Nagle Affidavit,
1J6-7, R.112; FFCL, ^2, n.l, R.523-524.
4.

The $100,500.00 purchase price was to be paid by Mr. Collard by three

separate actions, or Installments, as follows: (1) a down payment of $10,000.00
("Installment 1"); (2) assumption of mortgage loan owed by Nagle Construction
Company to First Security Bank in the approximate amount of $60,000.00 (the "FSB
Obligation"), (hereinafter, "Installment 2"); and (3) tender of 55,000 shares of stock of
the Utah Coal and Chemical Company ("Stock") for the balance of the purchase price of
$30,541.26 (hereinafter "Installment 3"). Id. See also, Plaintiffs Memorandum and Gary
Nagle Deposition attached thereto as Exhibit B at 16-17, R.152 (confirming amount of
FSB balance); FFCL, 1f3, R.523.
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5.

Mr. Collard tendered the down payment in satisfaction of the requirements

of Installment 1. Plaintiffs Memorandum, \S, R.129, and Gary Nagle Deposition,
attached thereto as Exhibit B, at 16-17, R. 152-153; FFCL, f4, R.523.
6.

Mr. Collard assumed and began making payments on the FSB Obligation

directly to First Security Bank in satisfaction of Installment 2, but did not refinance the
loan in his own name or otherwise remove Nagles from the FSB Obligation. Plaintiffs
Memorandum, ^|5, R.129, and Gary Nagle Deposition attached as Exhibit B thereto, at
16-17, R.152-153; FFCL, f5, R.523.
7.

Mr. Collard immediately took possession of the Property, Plaintiffs

Memorandum, ^|6, R.129; Affidavit of Gary Nagle, ^9, R.104, and recorded a Notice of
Contract on May 18, 1979. Plaintiffs Memorandum, 1J7, and "Notice Of Contract",
Exhibit C thereto. R.129, 164-165; FFCL, p , R.523.
8.

On or prior to September 18, 1979, Mr. Collard tendered 55,000 shares of

stock in San Juan Mining and Developing Company, the predecessor to Utah Coal &
Chemical Company, ("Stock"), as required by Installment 3 of the Contract; FFCL, | 7 ,
R. 524. Although the Defendant Gary Nagle initially denied receiving this stock, he
subsequently admitted receipt of the stock on or about September 18, 1979, after being
presented with a copy of the transfer documents. Plaintiffs Memorandum, f8, R.129;
Gary Nagle Deposition, Exhibit B to Plaintiffs Memorandum, at 18 (admitting receipt of
shares), R. 152.
9.

Defendant Gary Nagle testified that it was his intent that Mr. Collard was

to completely assume the FSB obligation and that the Nagles were to be removed from
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the FSB obligation. Plaintiffs Memorandum, f 9 and Gary Nagle Deposition, Exhibit B
thereto, at 27-29, R.129, 155; FFCL, f8, R. 524.
10.

Defendant Gary Nagle testified that due to Mr. Collard's financial

condition at the time, Mr. Collard was unable to refinance the FSB Obligation and that he
considered this to be a breach of the Contract. Plaintiffs Memorandum, f 10, and Gary
Nagle Deposition, Exhibit B thereto, at 10, R.129, 151.
11.

Defendant Gary Nagle testified that he told Mr. Collard he would not

deliver title to the Property to Mr. Collard because he could not satisfy the requirement of
assuming and refinancing the FSB Obligation. Plaintiffs Memorandum, |11 and Gary
Nagle Deposition, Exhibit B thereto, at 26-28, R.130, 155.
12.

Defendant Gary Nagle testified that he agreed to forego default and

foreclosure proceedings at that time because Mr. Collard agreed to pay an additional
$50,000 in consideration for the Property which became Addendum No. 2 to the
Contract. Plaintiffs Memorandum, f 12 and Addendum 2, Exhibit A thereto, R.130,147.
See also, Gary Nagle Deposition, 29, R. 155; FFCL, \% R.524.
13.

Under Addendum No. 2, Defendant Gary Nagle agreed to transfer title

to the Property to Collard upon the sale of the previously tendered stock for at least
$85,000.00. Plaintiffs Memorandum, fl3 and Addendum No. 2, Exhibit A thereto,
R.130, 147.
14.

Under Addendum No. 2, Mr. Collard further agreed that if the value of the

Stock did not reach a value of at least $85,000 within 1 year, he would tender additional
shares or cash to make up the difference. Plaintiffs Memorandum, f 14 and Addendum
No. 2, Exhibit A thereto, R.130, 147; FFCL, f 10, R.524.

R

15.

Defendant Nagle testified that Addendum No. 2 was executed on or about

September 18, 1979. Plaintiffs Memorandum, f 15 and Gary Nagle Deposition, Exhibit B
thereto, at 30, R.130, 156; FFCL, f 11, R.524.
16.

Defendant Gary Nagle testified that he believed that Mr. Collard was in

breach and default of the parties' Contract no later than January 25, 1981. Plaintiffs
Memorandum, ^|23 and Gary Nagle Deposition, Exhibit B thereto, R.132, 159.
17.

On January 13, 1981, several months after the one year period mentioned

in Addendum No. 2 had expired, the law firm of Jensen & Lloyd wrote a letter to Mr.
Collard on behalf of the Nagles, alleging that Mr. Collard had breached the Contract,
specifically the requirements of Addendum No. 2. Plaintiffs Memorandum,^\6 and
Letter dated January 13, 1981, Exhibit D thereto, R.130,166-167; FFCL |12, R.524.
18.

In the same letter, the Nagles' counsel declared that Mr. Collard's failure to

deliver additional stock or cash to satisfy the requirements of Addendum No. 2 prior to
January 25, 1981, would be "deemed by Nagle Construction to be a default under the
Contract and will result in the institution of legal proceedings against you for foreclosure
of the contract as a note and mortgage." Plaintiffs Memorandum, ^17 and Letter dated
January 13, 1981, Exhibit D thereto, R.130-131, 166-167, (Emphasis supplied); FFCL,
113,R.524-525.
19.

On January 25, 1981, attorney Kathryn Collard, daughter of LeRoy

Collard, wrote a letter to the Nagles' counsel with documentation from local stockbrokers
demonstrating that the stock in question could have been sold for the required $85,000.00
on any number of dates between its delivery and the letter of January 13, 1981. Plaintiffs
Memorandum, 1(18, and Exhibit E thereto, R.131,168; FFCL, fl4, R.525.
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20.

Current independent research also establishes that the 55,000 shares of

stock conveyed to Gary Nagle by Mr. Collard, could have been sold on any number of
occasions during the period between March of 1979 and the letter of January 13, 1981,
and realized the sum of $85,000.00. Plaintiffs Memorandum, If 19, and Affidavit of Steven
Earl, dated March 29, 2000, Exhibit F, attached thereto, R. 131,193-206.
21.

Although the Nagles claim that Mr. Collard never tendered stock or cash

sufficient to realize the $85,000 referred to in Addendum No. 2, See, ff 9-10, "Statement
Of Facts", Aplt. Br. 5, Defendant Gary Nagle testified that he believed that Mr. Collard
was in default and had breached the Contract no later than January 25, 1981, and that
neither he nor his attorneys had ever taken any action to sue Mr. Collard on the alleged
breach or default since that date. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ff23-24 and Gary Nagle
Deposition, Exhibit B thereto, at 41, R.131-132, 160-161; FFCL, f 16, R.525.
22.

Defendant Gary Nagle also admitted that no additional agreements or

changes to the Contract were entered into between he and Mr. Collard after January 25,
1981. Plaintiffs Memorandum,f21 and Gary Nagle Deposition, Exhibit B thereto at 44
(R. 131, 159); FFCL, f 17, R.525
23.

Defendant Gary Nagle further admitted that the Nagles have retained all

55,000 shares of Stock and the $10,000.00 down payment tendered by Mr. Collard.
Plaintiffs Memorandum, f24 and Gary Nagle Deposition, Exhibit B thereto, at 14, R.132,
152;FFCL,*h 18, R.525.
24.

Mr. Collard and/or his heirs have continuously made the Nagles' monthly

payments on the FSB Obligation since March, 1978. Kelly James Kirch, the daughter of
LeRoy Collard, began residing at the Property with Mr. Collard in 1991 and has
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continued to make the monthly mortgage payments on the FSB Obligation since Mr.
Collard's death in February, 1997. Plaintiffs Memorandum, |29 and Affidavit Of Kelly
James Kirch, ffifl-18, attached as Exhibit H thereto, R.132, 184-186.
25.

Mr. Collard and his daughter, Kelly James Kirch, have been in exclusive,

continuous and open possession of the Property for more than twenty years. Plaintiffs
Memorandum, ^[31 and Affidavit Of Kelly James Kirch, ffifl-18, attached as Exhibit H
thereto, R.132, 186-187.
26.

Mr. Collard and/or his heirs have paid all of the real property taxes,

assessments and improvements on the Property for more than twenty (20) years.
Plaintiffs Memorandum, ^32, and Affidavit of Kelly James Kirch, ff7-l 1, 14-15, Exhibit
H thereto, R.133, 185-186.
27.

The Nagles have not paid any property taxes on the subject Property since

1978; have not entered the Property in the past ten (10) years, and that have not paid for
any improvements on the Property since Mr. Collard took possession of the Property.
Plaintiffs Memorandum, f33, and Gary Nagle Deposition, Exhibit B thereto, at 53,
R.133, 161.
28.

Subsequent to the letter dated January 13, 1981, declaring Mr. Collard to

be in default and breach of the Contract, the Nagles took no affirmative legal action to
assert a default in the Contract until filing the Answer and Counterclaim in this matter in
September, 1999. R.l-12; FFCL, f21, R.526.
29.

On July 28, 1999, Kathryn Collard, as Trustee for the LeRoy Collard

Trust, filed the Complaint in this action, alleging causes of action to quiet title to the
Property in the subject Trust and for breach of contract and adverse possession.
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FFCL, 120, R.525.
30.

In September, 1999, the Nagles filed an Answer and Counterclaim against

Plaintiff Collard alleging as causes of action, forfeiture, foreclosure and quiet title, based
solely on Mr. Collard's alleged breaches of the parties' Contract prior to January 25, 1981.
R.24-38;FFCI,1f22,R.526.
31.

On October 12, 1999, Plaintiff Collard filed a Reply to Counterclaim,

asserting various defenses, including the applicable statute of limitations previously
referenced in the Nagles' Answer and Counterclaim, waiver and laches. R.46-54.
32.

On February 24, 2000, the Nagles filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,

R. 84-85. On March 29, 2000, Plaintiff Collard filed a Cross- Motion For Summary
Judgment, R.181-183.
33.

Following oral arguments on the parties' cross motions for summary

judgment on July 17, 2000, the lower court initially held that the statute of limitations
contained in §78-12-23, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, barred both parties' legal claims and
ordered further briefing on whether the court could grant Plaintiff Collard equitable
relief.
34.

After additional briefing, R.352-360, and oral argument on August 30,

2000, R. 645, clarifying the claims of the parties and the evidence regarding their claims,
the lower court modified its previous ruling and held that Plaintiff Collard's legal right to
quiet title would only accrue when the balance of the FSB Obligation was paid and that
Nagles should be ordered to deliver title to the Property to Collard at that time. Transcript
of Hearing August 30, 2001, R. 646, p.15, lines 9-17, p.16, lines 4-19; FFCL,
Conclusions of Law, 1ffll4-l5, R.528.
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35.

On November 6, 2000, after oral argument on the Plaintiffs motion for

attorney's fees and the Nagles' objections to Plaintiff Collard's proposed Findings of Fact
And Conclusions of Law, the lower court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Order (Final Judgment), R. 521-531. On November 8, 2000, the Court entered
an Order Denying Motion For Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs, R.532-534.
36.

On December 4, 2000, the district court entered an Order staying the

judgment on appeal on the condition that the Nagles post a supersedeas bond. R.599-604.
37.

On December 21, 2000, the district court entered an Order vacating the

stay of the judgment based on the Nagles' failure to post the supersedeas bond and
directed the escrow agent to release the warranty deed to the Property to the Plaintiff
Trust for recording in connection with the payoff of the obligation to First Security Bank
and the release of the Nagles from the FSB obligation. Thereafter, Plaintiff Collard sold
the Property to a third party for value. R. 621-626.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court correctly held that title to the subject Property should be quieted
in the Plaintiff Trust and that the Defendant Nagles' counterclaims for breach of contract,
forfeiture, foreclosure and quiet title, fail on the merits and/or are barred by the six year
statute of limitations contained in §78-12-23, U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
Contrary to the Nagles' arguments, the lower court did not finally decide that the
cited statute of limitations applied to bar the claims of both parties. The lower court
correctly held that the cited statute of limitations did not bar Plaintiff Collard's quiet title
claim based on its finding that such claim would not accrue until Plaintiff Collard paid
the outstanding balance owing on the FSB obligation. Alternatively, it is undisputed that
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Mr. Collard and his heirs were in continuous possession of the subject Property for over
twenty years from the date of its purchase through the filing of this action. Under such
circumstances, no statute of limitations bars Plaintiff Collard's action claim to quiet title
in the Property in the Plaintiff trust under Utah law.
The lower court also correctly held that the Nagles' claims for breach of the
parties' Contract had fully accrued not later than January 25,1987, such that these claims,
only asserted as counterclaims in this action in September, 1999, were barred by the six
year statute of limitations contained in §78-12-23, U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
When the Nagles failed to return the down payment and stock paid for the
Property by Mr. Collard, they elected the remedy of forfeiture as a matter of law and
could not pursue any other remedies. Thus, their alternative counterclaims for
foreclosure, damages and quiet title failed as a matter of law. The lower court also
correctly held that the Nagles' letter of January 13, 1981, providing that Mr. Collard was
in alleged breach of the parties' Contract and that a default would be declared unless he
cured the alleged breaches by January 25,1981, did not comply with the strict
requirements to effect a forfeiture of the Property under Utah law. The lower court also
correctly held that the Nagles' failure to take any subsequent affirmative legal action to
forfeit or foreclose on the Property, waived these claims and/or that such claims were
barred not later than January 25, 1987, by the six year statute of limitations contained in
§78-12-23, U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
Contrary to the Nagles' argument, the lower court correctly considered Plaintiff
Collard's statute of limitations defense to the Nagles' counterclaims because the Nagles
never raised the argument that the defense was insufficiently pleaded in the lower court;
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because the defense was adequately pleaded; because it was the only statute of limitations
that could apply, and because the Nagles' had waived any objection to Plaintiff Collard's
assertion of this defense by fully briefing and arguing the applicability of the defense to
both parties claims in the lower court.
The Nagles1 argument that their counterclaim for additional stock or cash,
although barred by the statute of limitations, may still be used as an offset, fails as a
matter of law because the parties' claims never coexisted, and the Nagles1 attempt to
circumvent the lower court's ruling dismissing their claims by asserting new affirmative
defenses for the first time on appeal, is without merit and furnishes no ground for the
reversal of the lower court's decision.
Finally, the lower court's decision not to award Plaintiff Collard the attorney's
fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of this action and in this appeal, is incorrect and
should be reversed because Plaintiff Collard prevailed on her preeminent quiet title claim
and also prevailed on the Defendant Nagles' counterclaims. The parties' Contract
provided for the payment of fees and costs to the party having to bring a legal action to
enforce their rights under the Contract against the defaulting party. Here, the Nagles
defaulted by refusing to deliver title to Plaintiff Collard when Plaintiff attempted to pay
off the FSB obligation, thereby precipitating the filing of this action.

The Nagles

acknowledged the applicability of the fees and costs provision of the parties' Contract by
pleading it in their Answer and Counterclaim, thus estopping the Nagles from claiming
that Plaintiff Collard is not entitled to receive attorney's fees and costs under the
provisions of the parties' Contract.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY QUIETED
TITLE IN THE PLAINTIFF TRUST AND DID NOT
ERR IN CONSIDERING PLAINTIFF COLLARD'S
DEFENSES TO THE NAGLESf COUNTERCLAIMS

Based upon its Findings of Fact, none of which are challenged in this appeal,
Aplt. Br. passim, the lower court correctly concluded that Plaintiff Collard's decedent,
LeRoy Collard, had performed all of the actions or "Installments" required for his receipt
of the title to the Property from the Nagles under the parties' Contract, and/or that the
Nagles' right to demand such performance had been modified or waived by their own
inaction, and/or was barred by the statute of limitations contained in §78-12-23, U.C.A.
(1953), as amended, such that Plaintiff Collard had a legal right to have title to the
Property quieted in the Plaintiff Trust as soon as Plaintiff Collard tendered payment of
the balance owing on the Nagles' mortgage loan from FSB ("the FSB Obligation"). See,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law And Order, R. 521-531.
Although the Nagles now complain that "the decision of the lower court in this
case has effectively given the property to Collard without payment of the full purchase
price", Aplt. Br. 10-12, Defendant Gary Nagle admitted in his deposition that he believed
that Mr. Collard had breached the parties' Contract by failing to tender the full purchase
price on or before January 25, 1981, but that neither he nor his attorneys ever took any
affirmative legal action to forfeit or foreclose on the Property even after giving notice of
the alleged breaches to Mr. Collard on January 13, 1981, and that the Nagles kept the
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down payment and stock tendered by Mr. Collard and accepted his mode of paying off
the Nagles' mortgage obligation to First Security Bank for over twenty years. See,
Statement ofFacts, 1fi[2l-24, 28, supra at 10-11.
Based upon Defendant Nagles1 own admissions, the lower court properly found
and concluded that the Nagles1 acceptance of Collard's direct payments to FSB for more
than twenty years and Nagles' failure to take any legal action on the alleged breach and
default of Installment No.2, after declaring it in the letter of January 13,1981, until filing
the Answer and Counterclaim in this matter in September of 1999, either modified the
parties' contract to permit Collard to perform Installment 2 by direct payments and/or
waived the Nagles' right to declare a breach or default of the Contract based on Collard's
direct payment of the FSB Obligation. See, FFCL, Findings of Fact, Nos. 2, 8, 9,12,16,
19, 21, 22 and Conclusions of Law, Nos. 4,5, 8, R.522-527.
By knowingly failing to pursue their alleged claims against Plaintiff Collard's
decedent for his alleged breaches of the parties' Contract for over two decades until
Plaintiff Collard filed this action in July, 1999, the Nagles' right to adjudicate disputed
issues of fact regarding the alleged breaches and their claims regarding the alleged
breaches, have been waived or barred by the statute of limitations contained in §78-1223, U.C.A. (1953), as amended. This result is purely the effect of the Nagles' inaction
and is not attributable to any unfair decision of the lower court as the Nagles seek to
portray. Aplt. Br. 10-12. Thus, the Nagles' argument on this point furnishes no basis
for the reversal of the lower court's decision and the decision should be affirmed.
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A.

The Nagles Have Waived Any Argument That The Lower Court
Erred In Considering The Plaintiffs Statute Of Limitations
Defense To Their Counterclaims
The Nagles first argue that the lower court erred in considering Plaintiff Collard's

statute of limitations defense in reference to Nagles' counterclaims for forfeiture,
foreclosure and to quiet title, because Collard did not plead the applicable statute of
limitations by section number. Aplt. Br. 8, 12-13. This argument fails for several reasons:
First, the Nagles had already specifically pleaded the applicable statute of limitations by
section number in their Answer And Counterclaim, R.59. Because Plaintiff Collard did
not deny that the statute of limitations cited by the Nagles was applicable to the parties'
claims, Plaintiff simply referred to it as the "applicable statutes of limitation" in Plaintiffs
Reply To Counterclaim, R.52. Second, no other statute of limitations could apply to the
parties' claims in this case. Thus, this case is immediately distinguishable from Wasatch
Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 24 U.2d 70,465 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1970), cited Aplt. Br. 12, in
which the Utah Supreme Court declined to consider arguments regarding a statute of
limitations that was never pleaded in reference to a cause of action for fraud that was
never pleaded. Third, the Nagles never raised this argument in the lower court and cannot
raise it for the first time on appeal, and in any event, no one could have been misled.
Attorney Gen. v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277, 114 A.L.R. 726 (1937). Fourth,
the Nagles waived this argument on appeal by fully briefing and arguing the application
of the cited statute of limitations to both parties' claims in the court below, thereby
consenting to its adjudication in the lower court. See, e.g., Clark v. Second Circuit Court,
741 P.2d 956, 957 (Utah 1987) (issues deemed tried by consent of the parties); Industrial
Indemnity Co. v. Wick Constr. Co., 680 P.2d 1100, 1103 n. 1 (Alaska 1984) (findings and
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conclusions demonstrate the issues were litigated); Quillin v. Heston Corp., 230 Kan.
591, 640 P.2d 1195,1196 (1982) (issue was considered by trial court even though not
specifically raised by the parties). Thus, the lower court correctly rules that the Nagles'
counterclaims were all waived and/or barred by the six year statute of limitations
contained in §78-12-23, U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
B.

The Lower Court Did Not Finally Determine That Both
Parties' Claims Were Barred By The Statute Of Limitations
Although the Nagles complain that the lower court "found that the statute of

limitations barred both parties from pursuing their claims", Aplt. Br. 8, 12-14, the lower
court modified this ruling after the second oral argument on the parties' cross motions for
summary judgment which further clarified the differing positions and claims of the
parties. See, Transcript of Hearing, August 30, 2001, R. 646, p.15, lines 9-17, p.16, lines
4-19; FFCL, Conclusions of Law, f^[14-15, R.528. Thus, the ruling does not appear in the
Court's final Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw And Order, as the Nagles concede.
Id. Although the Nagles imply that the lower court was not free to depart from its initial
ruling, Id., this argument is incorrect. The lower court had the right to modify this
interlocutory ruling at any time prior to the issuance of judgment. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310-1311 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994); Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d
1178, 1184-1185 (Utah 1993); and Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761
P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Here, the lower court correctly held that Plaintiff Collard's right to quiet title did
not fully accrue until the outstanding balance due on the FSB obligation was paid. For
this reason, the six year statute of limitations applicable to claims founded on a written
instrument contained in §78-12-23, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, and asserted as an
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affirmative defense to Plaintiff Collard's quiet title claim, could not have barred the claim
before it even accrued. See, "Statement of Facts", ff 7, 25, supra at 7,11.
C.

Those In Actual Possession Of Real Estate Are Not Barred
From Seeking To Quiet Title By Any Statute of Limitations
Alternatively, the six year statute of limitations contained in §78-12-23, U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, did not preclude Plaintiff Collard's quiet title claim because the
statute of limitations does not run against a party in possession of real property seeking to
quiet title under Utah law. Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff Collard and/or his heirs,
continuously possessed the subject Property from the date of its purchase until and after
the filing of this action. See, "Statement of Facts", ^25, supra at 11.
In Conder v. Hunt, 2000 Ut. App. 105, 1 P.3d 170 (2000), decided after the
parties1 cross motions for summary judgment were briefed, the Utah Court of Appeals
held that Utah "recognizes the general rule that those in actual possession of real estate
are never barred by any statute of limitation from seeking to quiet their title," citing
Riddickv. Street, 858 S.W.2d 63,64 (Ark. 1993); Muktarian v. Barmby, 407 P.2d 659,
660-61 (Cal. 1965); Ankoanda v. Walker-Smith, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39, 42-43 (Cal Ct.
App.), review denied, 1996 Cal. LEXIS 3695 (1996); Peterson v. Hopkins, 684 P.2d
1061,1065 (Mont. 1984); Viersen v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133, 138 (Okla. 1963). See also,
65 Am. Jur. 2d, Quieting Title, Section 55 (1972). In Conder, the Court also observes
that "while no Utah case cited by the parties specifically adopts this rule, a number of
cases seem to assume that Utah adheres to it." See, e.g., Rodgers v. Hansen, 580 P.2d
233, 235 (Utah 1978); Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 95 Utah 347, 352-53, 81 P.2d 374,
376-77(1938).
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Thus, under Conder, the six year statute of limitations contained in §78-12-23,
U.C.A.(1953), as amended, asserted by the Nagles, did not bar Plaintiff Collard's quiet
title claim as a matter of law because Mr. Collard and/or his heirs were in continuous
possession of the Property. For this additional reason, the lower court's decision quieting
title to the Property in the Plaintiff Trust and rejecting the Nagles' statute of limitations
defense to Plaintiff Collard's quiet title claim, should be affirmed.
Although the trial court did not rely on Conder in ruling that Plaintiff Collard's
quiet title claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, this Court may affirm the
trial court's judgment on any ground, even one not relied upon by the district court.
Hall v. Utah State Dept. ofCorr., 2001 UT 34,

P.3d

, citing, Cache County v.

Property Tax Div., 922 P.2d 758, 764 (Utah 1996); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d
231, 241 (Utah 1993); Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1920).
D.

The Lower Court Correctly Held That The Nagles' Counterclaims
Failed As A Matter Of Law Or Were Otherwise Barred By The
Statute of Limitations Contained in §78-12-23, U.C.A. (1953), As
Amended
The Nagles1 arguments that the lower court erred and acted "inconsistently" by

affording the Plaintiff Trust a remedy on its quiet title claim, while holding that Nagles'
counterclaims were barred by the six year statute of limitations contained in §78-12-23,
U.C.A. (1953), as amended, Aplt. App. 8-9, 12-13, are erroneous and ignore the crucial
distinctions between the positions of the parties and the status of their claims: First, as
explained above, Plaintiff Collard's quiet title claim had not accrued, whereas Nagles'
counterclaims had accrued not later than January 25, 1981. Second, Mr. Collard and his
successors continuously possessed the Property while the Nagles did not. Thus, for the
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legal reasons explained above, the lower court correctly ruled that the statute of
limitations did not bar Plaintiff Collard's quiet title claim because it had not accrued,
while it did bar the Nagles' counterclaims which had accrued and/or had been waived
long ago. Thus, the lower court's application of the statute of limitations was correct as a
matter of law and was not the result of any alleged inequity on the part of the lower court
as the Nagles suggest. Aplt. Br. 8-9; 12-14.
E.

The Nagles' Argument That Their Counterclaim For
Additional Stock Or Cash May Still Be Used As An Offset
Fails Because The Parties' Claims Never Coexisted
Unlike the parties in the cases cited by the Nagles, Aplt. Br. 15-16, the Nagles

never pleaded "offset" as an affirmative defense in their Answer and Counterclaim,
thereby waiving this affirmative defense under U.R.C.P. 12(h) by failing to plead it. R.2428. Moreover, the Nagles never asserted this defense in the lower court. Having failed to
do so, the Nagles have waived this defense and cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.
Moreover, although Utah law does allow otherwise time-barred claims to be
raised as an offset, the claims may only be offset "if they coexisted." See, Coulon v.
Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1996), citing Salt Lake City v. Teluride Power Co,,
17 P.2d 281, 286 (Utah 1932), cited Aplt. Br. 15-16. Under the undisputed facts of this
case, Nagles' "offset" argument fails because the parties' claims at no time coexisted.
The cross-demands must coexist; that is they must subsist
in such a way that if one party had brought suit on his demand
the other could have set up the demand he held against that of
the plaintiff. There must be an overlapping of live demands in
point of time. If the demand of one party becomes barred
and is not subsisting as a cause of action when the demand
of the other party comes into existence, the former demand
is not available.
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See, United Pacific Insurance Company v. Knudsen Construction, Inc., Case No.
2:97CV235C, (D. Utah, May 6, 2001), at 6, quoting Teluride, 17 P.2d at 285, quoting,
O'Neil v. Eppler, 162 P. 311, 312, Addendum A hereto.
As discussed above, the statute of limitations on Nagles1 counterclaims for
forfeiture, foreclosure and quiet title, ran not later than January 25, 1987, six years after
the Nagles' attorney notified Mr. Collard of the alleged breach and default alleged in their
Answer and Counterclaim in September, 1999. However, Plaintiff Collard's quiet title did
not fully accrue until Collard paid the outstanding balance on the Nagles' obligation to
First Security Bank after the filing of this action. Thus, the parties' claims never
"coexisted" and the Nagles' claim for "offset" fails as a matter of law.
POINT II

A.

THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
NAGLES' COUNTERCLAIMS FAILED AS A MATTER
OF LAW OR WERE OTHERWISE BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The Lower Court Correctly Ruled That The Nagles1 Counterclaims For
Forfeiture, Foreclosure And Quiet Title Failed As A Matter of Law
It is undisputed and the lower court found that under Addendum No. 2 to the

parties' Contract, executed on or about September 18, 1979, Mr. Collard agreed that if the
value of the 55,000 shares of stock he had delivered to Nagles did not reach a value of at
least $85,000 within 1 year, Collard would tender additional shares or cash to make up
the difference. On January 13, 1981, several months after the expiration of the 1 year
period specified in Addendum No. 2, attorneys for the Nagles wrote a letter to Mr.
Collard alleging Mr. Collard had breached the Contract, specifically the requirements of
Installment 3, as amended by Addendum No. 2. The letter declared that Collard's failure
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to tender additional stock or cash to satisfy the requirements of Installment 3, as amended
by Addendum No. 2, prior to January 25, 1981, would be "deemed by Nagle
Construction to be a default thereunder and will result in the institution of legal
proceedings against you for foreclosure of the contract as a note and mortgage."
It is also undisputed and the lower court found that on January 23, 1981, attorney
Kathryn Collard, wrote a letter to Nagles' counsel informing him that the Stock could
have been sold for $85,000 on any number of dates between its delivery and January 13,
1981, and providing brokerage records to support this assertion. Following receipt of this
letter, the Nagles failed to bring any foreclosure proceedings against Mr. Collard. Nagles
did, however, retain the $10,000 down payment and the Stock.
It is also undisputed and the lower court concluded as a matter of law, that "the
letter from Defendants' counsel dated January 13, 1981, did not satisfy the strict notice
and procedural requirements to effect a forfeiture under the Contract or Utah law.
Therefore, no forfeiture occurred, and even if it had, Nagles' subsequent failure to take
any affirmative legal action to forfeit or foreclose on the property for twenty years,
waived any forfeiture or foreclosure."
The undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that Nagles had elected the remedy
of forfeiture. Under Utah law, the election of the remedy of forfeiture is exclusive and
precludes recovery of any other damages under the contract or at law. McMillan v.
Shimmin, 349 P.2d 720 (Utah 1960). Forfeiture remedies such as those set forth in
Section 16A of the parties' Contract, are automatically elected if the vendor fails to return
the payments made by the vendee under an installment sales contract after default is
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declared. See, Thomas and Backman, Utah Real Property Law, Sec. 14.01 (e)(1);
McMillan v. Shimmin, 349 P.2d 720 (Utah 1960); Andreason v. Hansen, 335 P.2d 404
(Utah 1959).
It is also undisputed and the lower court found that "After sending the January 13,
1981, letter notifying Mr. Collard of the alleged default and electing the remedy of
foreclosure, Defendants failed to take any further action to foreclose on the Property.
Consequently, Defendants' claims and causes of action for foreclosure were barred by
§78-12-23, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, no later than January 25, 1987. See, FFCL, 1ffj
21-22, R.526.
At the hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on July 17,
2000, Nagles' attorney conceded that Nagles1 counterclaims for remedies other than
forfeiture, were precluded as a matter of law, because Nagles had never returned the
$10,000 cash down payment or the 55,000 shares of stock he received from Mr. Collard
on the Property. R. 644, at p.2, line 14, to p.3, line 5; p.4, line 24, to p.6, line 2. Thus,
Nagles' counterclaims for: (1) foreclosure; (2) the right to enforce the obligation to
convey additional stock or cash; and (3) quiet title, were extinguished by the Nagles'
election of the remedy of forfeiture.
B.

The Nagles May Not Raise Unpleaded Affirmative Defenses For
The First Time On Appeal To Circumvent Dismissal Of Their
Counterclaims
In the Nagles1 Answer And Counterclaim, the only affirmative defenses pleaded

by the Nagles were failure to state a claim, waiver, estoppel and the statute of limitations.
R. 26-27. The Nagles now attempt to circumvent the lower court's decision that their
counterclaims for breach of contract, forfeiture, foreclosure and quiet title, are barred by
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the six year statute of limitations, by reincarnating these dismissed counterclaims as
affirmative defenses and presenting them for the first time on appeal. Aplt. Br. 9-20.
For example, the Nagles' argument that Mr. Collard did not pay the purchase price
set forth in the parties' Contract, Aplt. Br. 9, constitutes the affirmative defense of "failure
of consideration" under U.R.C.P. 8(c). Nagles' argument that payment of the purchase
price was a "condition precedent" to delivery of title, also constitutes an affirmative
defense under U.R.C.P. 8 (c), and one which must be pleaded specifically and with
particularity under U.R.C.P. 9 (c). Aplt. Br. 16-20. Finally, the Nagles' argument that
Collard's obligation to pay the purchase price cannot be severed from Nagles' duty to
deliver title, Aplt. Br. 18-20, to the extent it is anything more than a reformulation of
Nagles' "condition precedent" affirmative defense, still constitutes an "avoidance" which
must be pleaded as an affirmative defense under U.R.C.P. 8 (c) or be waived. These
newly minted affirmative defenses were never pleaded by the Nagles in their Answer and
Counterclaim and have been waived pursuant to U.R.C.P. 12(h), Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d
1352 (Utah 1986), and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In addition, to the
extent that Nagles are claiming that Mr. Collard breached the parties' Contract by
allegedly failing to pay part or all of the purchase price for the subject Property, such
claims have been waived or are barred by the statute of limitations for the reasons
discussed above.
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C.

The Lower Court's Conclusion That The Nagles Waived Collard's
Formal Assumption Of The Mortgage Is Supported By The Lower
Court's Undisputed Findings Of Fact
Finally, the Nagles argue that "the conclusion that Nagles waived Collard's

assumption of the mortgage is a disputed matter of fact which could not be determined on
a motion for summary judgment," Aplt. Br. 21-23, is untenable. To the contrary, this
conclusion is amply supported the Defendant Gary Nagle's own testimony and
admissions, which are reflected in the undisputed factual findings of the lower court,
none of which are challenged by the Nagles on appeal. See, Findings of Fact Nos. 5-19,
R.521-530. "We uphold a lower court's findings of fact unless the evidence supporting
them is so lacking that we must conclude the finding is 'clearly erroneous.'" Jeffs v.
Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,1244 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted).
In Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993), cited Aplt.
Br. 21, the Court held that "to constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it.. .We further
clarify that the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct." Here, Defendant Gary Nagle
admitted that he believed that Mr. Collard was in breach and default of the parties'
Contract by not taking Nagles off the mortgage, not later than January 25,1981. In Utah,
statutes of limitation begin to run "at the moment that a cause of action arises."
Fredrickson v. Knight Land Corp,, 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1993). Thus, based on Defendant
Gary Nagle's own testimony, it is apparent that the Nagles had knowledge of an alleged
right to sue for breach and default of the Contract by the letter dated January 13,1991.
Under the six year statute of limitations applicable to all actions based on written
instruments including mortgage instruments, the Nagles had a duty to bring suit on
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Collard's alleged breaches and default under the parties' Contract no later than January
25, 1997. See, U.C.A., §78-12-23; see also, Crompton v. Jensen, 1 P.2d 242, 245 (Utah
1938); Utah Real Property Law, 14.03 (cc) (3)(v)(B)(VII). Yet, Defendant Gary Nagle
admitted in his deposition that neither he nor his counsel ever took any affirmative legal
action to follow up on the letter of January 13,1981, or to otherwise forfeit or foreclose
on the Property, and further admitted that he allowed Collard to make direct payments on
the FSB obligation for more than twenty years including up to and after the filing of this
action. Thus, the lower court's conclusion that the Nagles had waived their right to have
Collard taken them off the mortgage, is fully supported by Nagles' own testimony as
reflected in findings of fact of the lower court set forth above. Accordingly, the Nagles'
argument that "there is no evidence before the Court to indicate that Nagle accepted or
continued to accept that procedure", Aplt. Br. 21-23, simply ignores the foregoing
evidence and the court's factual findings on this issue, instead of marshalling the evidence
to show that they are "clearly erroneous" such that they could not support the challenged
legal conclusion. Accordingly, the Nagles' argument that the lower court's erred by
holding that the Nagles has waived Collard's formal assumption of the mortgage by
accepting Collard's direct mortgage payments to First Security Bank on behalf of the
Nagles for more than twenty years, is without merit and must be rejected.
D.

The Lower Court's Decision Should Also Be Affirmed Under
The Defense Of Laches
Plaintiff Collard also asserted laches as a defense to the Nagles' Counterclaims for

forfeiture, foreclosure and Quiet Title. R. 43-56. The doctrine of laches has long been
recognized in the context of quiet title actions. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d
156 (Utah 1976). In Utah, laches will bar recovery where the party asserting laches can
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show: (1) lack of diligence on the part of the offending party; (2) causing an injury to
another because of the offending party's lack of diligence. Plateau Mining Co, v. Utah
Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 731 (Utah 1990).
The Montana Supreme Court has held that in determining whether laches will bar
a claim the court is to consider several factors, including whether the party or an
important witness has died, thereby depriving the injured party of important testimony;
whether the property involved has increased in value; whether the property has passed
into the hands of innocent third persons; and whether the position of he parties has
changed resulting in injustice in the event laches is not applied. Filler v. Richland
County, 247 Mont. 285, 290, 806 P.2d 537 (Mont. 1991). Similarly, the Wyoming
Supreme Court has held that there is an inherent injustice in permitting one who
purportedly holds a right to assert ownership in property to await a propitious event and
then, when all risk is over, assert a claim. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that courts
should look with disfavor on the claims of parties who "lie idle and wait for the results to
play out to the prejudice of others." See, Madrid v. Norton, 596 P.2d 1108,1120 (Wyo.
1979).
Here, the Defendant Gary Nagle specifically admits in his Answer and
Counterclaim that he was fully aware of his right to sue Collard, but that he has simply
been sitting and waiting: "Nagle reasoned that because he held legal title to the Property .
.. he could simply wait and eventually, if Collard wanted to obtain legal title, Collard
would have to make good on his obligations...", See, Defendants' Counterclaim, Para.
30, R. 32. This is exactly the type of conduct the Montana and Wyoming Supreme Court
identified as inequitable conduct in refusing to allow the offending party to sit on its legal
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rights indefinitely and await the turn of events. Moreover, there is no evidence whatsoever that the Nagles were impaired or unable to proceed with legal action on their alleged
counterclaims for the past nineteen years.
Additionally, the passage of such a significant period of time has resulted in
severe prejudice to Plaintiff Collard, satisfying a second criteria for laches. See, Plateau
Mining, 802 P.2d supra, at 731. By waiting for the passage of nearly 20 years, the
Nagles can now offer virtually any self-serving testimony regarding the events that
transpired between himself and Mr. Collard. Moreover, in the two decades that have
elapsed, the original Contract has been lost, the daily trading history of the Stock has
been lost or is difficult to determine because the brokerages and transfer agents have gone
out of business, material witnesses have died and the Defendant Gary Nagle's own
memory has faded significantly, as shown by his failure to remember that he had received
and kept the 55,000 shares of stock conveyed to him by Mr. Collard pursuant to the
parties' Contract.
The passage of time, the loss of key documents and the death of Mr. Collard have
all operated to prejudice the Plaintiff while the Nagles sat idly by waiting to see whether
they would be better off by holding the Stock or attempting to recover the Property when
someone inquiring after the legal title. Even assuming arguendo that the Nagles' claims
are not waived or barred by the six year statute of limitations in §78-12-23, equity
demands that Nagles not be permitted to sit on their rights for twenty years and then elect
the option that best suits them. Thus, Nagles' counterclaims are barred by the doctrine of
laches and for this additional reason, the lower court's decision should be affirmed.
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POINT III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS UNDER
THE PARTIES' CONTRACT

Where a contract provides the "right to attorney fees, Utah courts have allowed
the party who successfully prosecuted or defended against a claim to recover the fees
attributable to those claims on which the party was successful." Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S.
Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, 993 P.2d 222, 227 (1999), quoting Occidental/
Nebraska Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 791 P.2dd 217, 221 (Ut Ct App. 1990). "Furthermore,
when a plaintiff brings multiple claims involving a common core of facts and related
legal theories, and prevails on at least some of its claims, it is entitled to compensation for
all attorney fees reasonably incurred in the litigation." Dejavue, supra at 227, quoting,
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,435,103 S.Ct.1933, 1940 (1983)(additional citations
omitted.)
In this action, Plaintiff Collard asserted claims for quiet title, breach of contract
and adverse possession, and prevailed on the quiet title claim which was the primary
claim in the action. Plaintiff Collard also had to defend and prevailed on the Nagles'
counterclaims for forfeiture, foreclosure and quiet title. Having brought multiple claims
involving a common core of facts and related legal theories, and having prevailed on
Plaintiffs preeminent quiet title claim and having defeated Nagles' counterclaims, the
Plaintiff Trust is entitled to compensation for all attorney fees and costs reasonably
incurred in the litigation." See, Dejavue, supra at 227, quoting, Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1940 (1983). With respect to the payment of
attorney's fees and costs, the parties' Uniform Real Estate Contract provides that:
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21. The Buyer and Seller each agTee that should they default in
any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that the
defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a
reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from
enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the
premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy provided
hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such
remedy is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise.
See, Contract, §21, R.41.
Although the lower court denied Plaintiff Collard attorney's fees and costs without
allowing oral argument, based on "my sense of this matter being a very difficult and a
controversial case, in which it was unclear what the governing law is given how long ago
it was, and it just seems to the Court that it would be an iniquity (sic) as well as against
the law to award those fees", R. 646, p.l, these are not sufficient reasons for denying
Plaintiff Collard the attorney's fees and the costs incurred by the Plaintiff Trust in
enforcing its rights under the parties' Contract, where the Contract specifically provided
for the award of such fees and costs incurred in enforcing a party's rights under the
Contract. R. 412-423.
The very factors mentioned by the lower court in denying Plaintiffs motion for
attorney's fees, demonstrate how difficult it was for the Plaintiff to prevail in this matter.
Given the barrage of legal arguments and defenses deployed by the Nagles, the Plaintiff
Trust necessarily incurred substantial attorney's fees and costs in order to demonstrate to
the lower court why the Nagles' multiple legal arguments were without merit and that the
Plaintiff Trust was entitled to prevail. Because the Plaintiff Trustee, Kathryn Collard,
does not specializes in property law, the Plaintiff Trust was required to engage and pay
for the services of an attorney practicing in that area of the law.

1?

Plaintiff Collard was also at an additional disadvantage in litigating this action
because her father, Mr. Collard, had died prior to the filing of this action, leaving the
Nagles free to make self-serving statements concerning the parties' dealings. In fact, as
stated above, the Nagles initially denied that they had received any stock from Mr.
Collard and would have been able to maintain that position throughout this litigation if
the Plaintiff had not located and placed in evidence, the old stock transfer records
confirming that the Nagles had received the 55,000 shares of stock Mr. Collard was
obligated to convey under the parties' Contract.
Defendants' arguments that it would be inequitable for the Court to award
attorney's fees in this matter because "Defendants were never in default and Collard never
performed", R. 501, are without merit. It is undisputed that the Nagles refused to convey
title to Plaintiff Collard in the Spring of 1999 when Plaintiff Collard gave notice of her
intent to pay off the FSB Obligation and sell the Property, thereby precipitating the filing
of this action to quiet title to the Property in the Plaintiff Trust once the obligation was
paid.
Nagles' alternative, unsubstantiated argument that "Collard never performed",
likewise furnishes no reason for the denial of Plaintiff s fee claim pursuant to the parties'
Contract, where the Nagles knowingly sat on their rights for more than nineteen years
they alleged the breach of the parties' Contract, waiting to see whether it was more
advantageous to hold the stock or attempt to retake the Property or use their unasserted
claims as a defense to an individual seeking legal title.
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In this case, both Plaintiff Collard and the Defendant Nagles asserted their
entitlement to attorney's fees and costs under the terms of the Contract. See, Complaint,
R.6; Answer and Counterclaim, % R. 28, 37, Thus, the Nagles are estopped from
claiming that the Contract's attorney fee provision does not apply to this case.
Additionally, the Nagles did not challenge the amount or reasonableness of the attorney's
fees and costs requested by Plaintiff. R. 501, 507.
Based on the foregoing, the Court should reverse the lower court's denial of
attorney's fees and costs, and award the Plaintiff Trust the reasonable attorney's fees and
costs incurred in the prosecution of the lower court and in this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The lower court's decision quieting title in the Plaintiff Trust and dismissing the
Defendant Nagles' counterclaims as being without merit, waived and/or barred by the
statute of limitations, is correct and should be affirmed. The lower court's decision
denying attorney's fees and costs to the Plaintiff Trust under the provisions of the parties'
Contract is incorrect and should be reversed, and the Plaintiff Trust should be awarded its
attorney fees and costs reasonably incurred in the lower court and in this appeal
DATED AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of November,
2001.
THE LAWEIRM OF KATHRYN COLLARD,LC
KATHRYN CpLEXRB—'
/Attorney For Plaintiff
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UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY, a Pennsylvania corporation, Plaintiff, v.
KNUDSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah corporation, et. al, Defendants/Third
Party Plaintiffs, v. DALE BARTON AGENCY, a Utah corporation, Third-Party
Defendant.
Case No. 2:97CV235C
United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division.
May 6, 2001

ORDER
TENA CAMPBELL, United States District Judge
This diversity matter comes before the court on cross-motions for
partial summary judgment by Plaintiff United Pacific Insurance Company
("UP" or "surety"), Third-Party Defendant Dale Barton Agency ("Barton"),
and Defendants Knudsen Construction, Inc., et. al (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Knudsen" or "indemnitors"). UP and Barton
move for summary judgment on several claims, asserting: 1) that UP's
claimed attorneys1 fees - the basis for UP f s first claim of relief
- are now payable on demand because the written indemnity agreement
between UP and Knudsen is clear on its face and there is no implied
reasonableness requirement on fees claimed; 2) that Knudsenfs seven
counterclaims for relief against UP are barred by the applicable statutes
of limitation; and 3) that Knudsenfs five claims for relief contained in
the Third-Party Complaint against Barton are similarly barred by the
applicable statutes of limitation. Knudsen moves for partial summary
judgment, asserting: 1) there is an implied element of reasonableness in
the agreement and that therefore they are not liable for excessive or
redundant fees; and 2) that some of UP f s claimed fees are time-barred.
Knudsen has not moved for summary judgment on any of its counterclaims
against UP nor for its third-party claims against Barton.
Background
This is a case regarding indemnity for attorneys1 fees. Plaintiff UP
is a corporate surety that issued performance and payment bonds ("bonds")
to cover a Utah construction project undertaken by Knudsen. UP is
seeking to enforce a written indemnity agreement ("agreement") that
requires Knudsen to reimburse UP for all attorney fees and expenses
("attorneys' fees" or "fees") which UP incurred subsequent to its
issuance of bonds for a construction project.
At issue are approximately $1.2 million in attorneys' fees and costs
that UP incurred while first defending, and then successfully seeking to
overturn an adverse judgment, in an action by the construction project's
lender against the bonds issued by UP. In that action, the lender first
obtained a $3.5 million dollar judgement against UP. In an effort to

overturn this adverse judgment, UP hired its own counsel and, after a
seven-year litigation period, successfully absolved itself of liability
after an appeal process which reversed the judgment and remanded the case
for a new trial, which ultimately ended in a judgment for UP.
In the present case, UP is seeking what it alleges is the entire amount
of attorneys1 fees that it incurred overturning the earlier judgment. In
doing so, it relies primarily on three provisions in the agreement:
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the execution of
any such Bond or Bonds and as an inducement of such
execution, we, the undersigned, agree and bind
ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators,
successors, and assigns, jointly and severally:

SECOND: To indemnify, and keep indemnified, and hold
and save harmless the Surety against all demands,
claims, loss, costs, damages, expenses, and attorneys1
fees whatever, and any and all liability therefor,
sustained or incurred by the Surety by reason of
executing or procuring the execution of any said Bond
or Bonds, or any other Bonds, which may be already or
hereafter executed on behalf of the Contractor, or
renewal or continuation thereof; or sustained or
incurred by reason of making any investigation on
account thereof, prosecuting or defending any action
brought in connection therewith, obtaining a release
therefrom, recovering or attempting to recover any
salvage in connection therewith, or enforcing by
litigation or otherwise any of the agreements herein
contained. Payment of amount due surety hereunder
together with legal interest shall be payable upon
demand.
(Indemnity Agreement at 1.) (emphasis added).

TENTH: The Surety shall have the exclusive right for
itself and for the undersigned to decide and determine
whether any claim, demand, suit or judgment upon said
Bond or Bonds shall, on the basis of liability,
expediency or otherwise be paid, settled, defended or
appealed, and its determination shall be final,
conclusive and binding upon the undersigned . . ./ and
any loss, costs, charges, expense or liability thereby
sustained or incurred, as well as any and all
disbursement on account of costs, expenses and
attorneys' fees, deemed necessary or advisable by the
Surety shall be borne and paid immediately by the
undersigned, together with legal interest. In the
event of any payment, settlement, compromise or
investigation, an itemized statement of the payment,
loss, costs, damages, expenses, or attorneys' fees,
sworn to by any officer of the Surety or the voucher
or vouchers or other evidence of such payment,
settlement or compromise, shall be prima facie

evidence of the fact and extent of the liability of
the undersigned to the Surety in any claim or suit
hereunder and in any and all matters arising between
the undersigned and the Surety.
Id. at 2. UP contends that these clauses require Knudsen to reimburse UP
for any claims it tenders because "the extent of the liability of"
Knudsen is determined solely by the sum sworn by UP and that this sum,
once demanded, is now payable to UP. In essence, UP claims that all that
is required by the agreement is that UP submit a sworn list that tallies
the attorneys' fees it paid.
Knudsen, on the other hand, while admitting that it has a duty to
reimburse UP for attorneys' fees, challenges the amount it actually
owes. Knudsen argues that the amount claimed by UP is too great, and
that it actually owes UP a lesser amount for basically two reasons:
first, it asserts that some of the fees are redundant and/or unreasonable
and are therefore not subject to reimbursement under the agreement;
second, it argues that some of the fees are time-barred by the applicable
statute of limitation.
In addition Knudsen also has counterclaims against both UP and Barton.
Knudsen contends that its agreement with UP is a grossly unfair,
one-sided contract of adhesion. Knudsen also argues that UP and Barton
breached their alleged fiduciary duty to Knudsen to assure that the
construction lender had properly escrowed the loan proceeds the loan
proceeds for the construction project. In answer to these claims, UP
counters, asserting first that claims for fee reimbursement under the
contract must be accepted on their face absent a showing of fraud or bad
faith (not unreasonableness), and second that none of its claims are
time-barred. UP and Barton also contend that Knudsen!s counterclaims are
time-barred.
The questions to be resolved, therefore, are: 1) whether the agreement
is binding on its own terms or whether it has an implied element of
reasonableness requiring that UP must not only submit an accounting of
fees it demands from Knudsen, but also ensure that submitted fees are
reasonable; 2) whether any of the fees UP submitted are time-barred under
the applicable statute of limitations; 3) whether Knudsen's counterclaims
are time-barred or otherwise legally barred.[fnl]
Analysis
A. Is the Indemnity Agreement Enforceable on Its Face or Should the Court
Imply a Standard of Reasonableness Regarding the Amount of Fees
Claimed?
Under Utah law,[fn2] "[a]ttorney fees awarded pursuant to contract or
statute are usually those found by the court to be xreasonable, ' unless
the statute or contract provides otherwise." Ringwood v. Foreign Auto
Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1361 (Utah App. 1990) (emphasis added),
quoting Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1989).
The Ringwood court applied this rule in an indemnity situation. See id.
Knudsen relies on this case in support of its contention that all claims
for attorneys1 fees under indemnity agreements are, under Utah law,
subject to a determination of reasonableness. Knudsen, however, does not
address exception to the rule where a statute or a contract provides
otherwise.
Under Utah law, "contracts mean what they say, and parties will be

bound by them." Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 906 n. 1 (Utah
App. 1995) citing Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock
Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1047 (Utah 1985). It is axiomatic in Utah contract
law that "[p]ersons dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on
their own terms without the intervention of the courts for the purpose of
relieving one side or the other from the effects of a bad bargain."
Biesinger v. Behunin, Utah, 584 P.2d 801, 803 (1978). Parties "should be
permitted to enter into contracts that actually may be unreasonable or
which may lead to hardship on one side." Carlson v. Hamilton,
332 P.2d 989, 991 (1958); see also Bekins V Ranch v. Huth, Utah,
664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1983) (affirming policy). "Although courts will
not be parties to enforcing flagrantly unjust agreements, it is not for
the courts to assume the paternalistic role of declaring that one who has
freely bound himself need not perform because the bargain is not
favorable." Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1040. These principles are
continually reaffirmed in Utah case law. See, e.g., id. (recognizing
cases and policy). "[T]he courts cannot supervise decisions made in the
business world and grant relief when the bargain proves improvident."
Cole v. Parker, 300 P.2d 623, 626 (Utah 1956). Absent "legal excuse or
justification for failure to perform the obligations of a contract, it
must be enforced according to its terms." Zions Properties, Inc. v.
Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975). These principles have been
recognized and applied in indemnity contracts. See Pavoni v. Nielsen,
999 P.2d 595, 599 (Utah App. 2000).
The important question is therefore: does the agreement "provide
otherwise"? The agreement reads:
The Surety shall have the exclusive right for itself
and for the undersigned to decide and determine
whether any claim, . . . suit or judgment upon said
Bond or Bonds shall . . . be paid, settled, defended
or appealed, and its determination shall be final,
conclusive and binding upon the undersigned . . .; and
any loss, costs, charges, expense or liability thereby
sustained or incurred, as well as any . . . costs,
expenses and attorneys1 fees, deemed necessary or
advisable by the Surety shall be borne and paid
immediately by the undersigned. . . .
In the event of
any payment, settlement, compromise or investigation,
an itemized statement of the payment, loss, costs,
damages, expenses, or attorneys1 fees, sworn to by any
officer of the Surety or the voucher or vouchers or
other evidence of such payment, settlement or
compromise, shall be prima facie evidence of the fact
and extent of the liability of the undersigned to the
Surety in any claim or suit hereunder and in any and
all matters arising between the undersigned and the
Surety.
(Indemnity Agreement 1 10.) (emphasis added).
This provision explicitly provides that a sworn statement by an officer
of UP on the extent and fact of liability is evidence of the actual
extent and liability to the surety. Because the indemnity contract
explicitly provides that the surety has the exclusive right to determine
appropriate attorney action and that the indemnitor is bound that
decision, Knudsen is liable for the fees as tendered so long as they were
not tendered in bad faith. No implied element of reasonableness inheres
in the agreement because the agreement specifically provides otherwise.

UP is thus entitled to attorneys1 fees in the amount tendered to the
extent that they were not tendered in bad faith.[fn3]
B. Are Some Claims at Issue Time-Barred?: The Applicable Statute
of Limitations
1. UP's Claims for Fees
Under Utah law, an action on any contract, obligation or liability
founded upon an instrument in writing must be brought within six years.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (1996) . "As a general rule, a cause of
action for indemnity does not arise until the party seeking indemnity
results in his damage, either through payment of a sum clearly owed or
through the injured party's obtaining an enforceable judgment." Perry v.
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added).
The Indemnity Agreement specifically provides:
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the execution of
any such Bond or Bonds and as an inducement of such
execution, we, the undersigned, agree and bind
ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators,
successors, and assigns, jointly and severally: . . .
To indemnify, and keep indemnified, and hold and save
harmless the Surety against all demands, claims,
loss, costs, damages, expenses, and attorneys' fees
whatever, and any and all liability therefor,
sustained or incurred by the Surety by reason of
executing or procuring the execution of any said Bond
or Bonds, or any other Bonds, which may be already or
hereafter executed on behalf of the Contractor, or
renewal or continuation thereof; or sustained or
incurred by reason of making any investigation on
account thereof, prosecuLing or defending any action
brought in connection therewith, obtaining a release
therefrom, recovering or attempting to recover any
salvage in connection therewith, or enforcing by
litigation or otherwise any of the agreements herein
contained. Payment of amount due surety hereunder
together with legal interest shall be payable upon
demand.
(Indemnity Agreement at 1.) (emphasis added).
Under the plain language of the contract, it is apparent that failure
to pay upon demand would constitute breach. Indeed, UP asserts that
Knudsen breached the indemnity agreement by refusing to pay UP "upon
demand" as provided by the agreement. UP paid its counsel in the
underlying action monthly from 1986 to 1996. Thereafter, UP made a
demand, as provided by the indemnity agreement, for Knudsen to indemnify
them for total costs.
Knudsen refused to tender payment upon UP's demand
in 1996 and UP contends that this action was a breach of the specific
provision emphasized above. UP filed this action April 11, 1997, less
than a year after the alleged breach. Utah law provides that an action
on any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in
writing must be brought within six years. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-23. As such, none of UPfs claims are time barred. The breach of
contract claim was brought within one year of the alleged breach Knudsen*s refusal to pay "upon demand" - and is therefore well

within the six year statutory allotment.
2. Knudsen's Counterclaims
Knudsen's counterclaims are in part based on an allegation of breach of
fiduciary duty by UP and Barton. Knudsen contends that: when UP and
Barton issued bonds to the Knudsen, UP and Barton breached their
fiduciary duty to discern that the owner's construction lender had failed
to escrow the loan proceeds in a construction account sufficient to
insure that Knudsen would be fully paid for its work. The remaining
counterclaims rely on an allegation that the indemnity agreement is
grossly unfair, one-sided contract of adhesion. As a threshold matter,
there are two issues with regard to viability Knudsens's counterclaims:
first, whether their claims against UP are time-barred, and, even if so,
are they still permitted as a "set-off"; and 2) whether their claims
against Barton are time-barred.
With regard to the claim that UP and Barton breached their fiduciary
duty to Knudsen to monitor the escrow of construction loan proceeds,
sufficient evidence has been presented to demonstrate that Knudsen knew
about the problems with the loan escrow at the latest in 1988. With
regard to the second claim that the indemnity agreement is a contract of
adhesion, Knudsen signed the agreement in 1982. Under Utah law, an
action for cancellation of an instrument is generally deemed to accrue on
the date on which the instrument was delivered. See, e.g., Baker v.
Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 635 (Utah 1984). At best then, given the six year
statute of limitation in Utah, Knudsen's counterclaim could only have
been brought as late 1994, six years after it would have known about any
alleged problems with the escrow. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23
(six-year statute of limitation on actions based upon a written
instrument). Therefore, no matter how Knudsen styled its claim against
UP, it would fall well outside the six years allowed by the statute of
limitation since the counterclaims were filed in 1997. [fn4]
Utah law does, however, allow otherwise time-barred claims to be raised
as a "setoff" against liability claims. Jacobsen v. Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208,
1210 (Utah 1985). "A defendant may therefore utilize a counterclaim,
normally barred by the statute of limitations, to offset a plaintiff's
claim, but only to the extent the claims equal each other." Coulon v.
Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1996). However, the claims may be
offset only if they coexisted. See id. (emphasis added), citing Salt
Lake City v. Telluride Power Co., 17 P.2d 281, 286 (Utah 1932). On this
point, Knudsen's "offset" argument fails because the claims at no time
coexisted.
[T]he cross-demands must coexist; that is they must
subsist in such a way that if one party had brought
suit on his demand the other could have set up the
demand he held against that of the plaintiff. There
must be an overlapping of live demands in point of
time. If the demand of one party becomes barred and
is not subsisting as a cause of action when the demand
of the other party comes into existence, the former
demand is not available.
Telluride, 17 P.d at 285, quoting O'Neil v. Eppler, 162 P. 311, 312
(emphasis added).
"[T]wo claims are coexistent and overlapping in point
of time . . . [if] both are subsisting claims before the statute of
limitations has run against either. Id. at 286 (emphasis added). Here,
as discussed above, the statute of limitations ran on Knudsen's

counterclaim at the latest in 1994 - six years after Knudsen knew
of any alleged problem with the escrow. This present action was filed in
1991, and therefore Knudsens claimed "setoff" action against UP is at
least three years too late.
Knudsen's claim against Barton for breach of fiduciary duty is
similarly time-barred. As discussed above, the claim against Barton's
alleged breach of fiduciary duty would have begun to run in 1988, the
latest date that the evidence suggests Knudsen would have known of the
apparent problem with the escrow. Knudsen's claim against Barton
therefore fails because the statute of limitation ran on the claim, six
years later, in 1994. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. Accordingly,
Knudsen's claim against Barton is time-barred. Finally, because Barton
has no claim against Knudsen, Knudsen cannot maintain that its claim
against Barton is a "setoff."
Order
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion for summary
judgment is DENIED and Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part as to Defendants' counterclaims and
third-party claims.
[fnl] Knudsen has not moved for summary judgment on the merits of its
counterclaims. Therefore, only UP's and Barton's contention that the
counterclaims are legally barred is at issue.
[fn2] At the March 28, 2001 hearing on these cross motions, the parties
agreed that Utah law governs this matter.
[fn3] UP concedes that this seeming "blank check" regarding attorneys'
fees can be challenged if it is demonstrated that plaintiff committed
fraud or acted in bad faith in submitting fees for indemnification.
(PL's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Part. Summ. J. at 5-6.)
ffn4] With regard to the first issue, defendants seem to concede that
their counterclaims would be time-barred under the applicable statute of
limitations, but nevertheless contend that their claims are valid as a
setoff.
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